Lethal incompetence (Jeffrey Bordin)
torpedo
p.590
Bordin
during the late 1930s, naval officers discovered serious quality problems in torpedo manufacturing,
His doctoral dissertation at Claremont graduate school ha explored “how elite governmental decision makers come to ignore or refute valid information during their deliberations.” The paper began by recounting how, during the late 1930s, naval officers discovered serious quality problems in torpedo manufacturing, yet the officers “acquiesced to both political and organizational pressures to ignore” the defects. THen, in 1942, at the Battle of midway, nearly a hundred American airmen flew torpedo-armed planes against a vastly superior Japanese force. “Despite the Holocaust they were flying into”, Bordin recounted, “every aircrew pressed their attack ── many while literally engulfed in flames.” Yet their bravery came to naught because “not a single torpedo detonated against a Japanese warship.” This failure “enabled the Japanese to launch a devastating counter strike that culminated in the loss of the USS Yorktown and 141 American lives.” The title of Bordin's work signaled his perspective on these and similar cases: “Lethal incompetence: studies in political and military decision-making.” Early in his career, Bordin worried that he had been too hard on commanders he chronicled. Later, he decided, “I wasn't hard enough.”
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oBkzu73s1esw9jMfj-lrVJAc-L_E11qO/view?usp=sharing
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oBkzu73s1esw9jMfj-lrVJAc-L_E11qO/view?usp=sharing
https://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE02/Bordin02.html
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL COGNITION AND RESISTANCE TO ERRONEOUS AUTHORITATIVE AND GROUPTHINK DEMANDS DURING A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS GAMING EXERCISE
by Jeffrey Bordin, Ph.D.
Captain, U.S. Army Reserve
Paper to be presented at the Joint Services Conference On Professional Ethics, January 24-25, 2002, Springfield, VA.
In the late 1930 s naval officers responsible for monitoring the construction of the U.S. Navy s torpedoes discovered serious and widespread manufacturing defects. However, they acquiesced to political and organizational pressures to ignore the discrepancies. Unwilling to jeopardize their military careers, they took no corrective action (cf. Morison, 1963, pp. 12-13).
On the morning of June 4th, 1942, 51 U.S. warplanes armed with torpedoes took off in a desperate attack on a vastly superior Japanese military force that was closing on Midway Island. The U.S. airmen were well aware of the stakes and the almost insurmountable odds against their own survival. Despite the holocaust they were flying into, every aircrew pressed their attack many while literally engulfed in flames. Virtually all the aircraft were destroyed, and 98 airmen were killed. It is likely that at least two, and possibly three or more U.S. pilots attempted to crash their fatally stricken aircraft into a Japanese warship during their final moments; another bomber pilot, Captain Richard Fleming, succeeded in doing so later in the battle. Despite the incredible courage, the resolute determination and the selfless sacrifice of these attacks, not a single torpedo detonated against a Japanese warship. The torpedoes were defective (cf. Fuchida & Okumiya, 1982; Levite, 1987; Lord, 1967; Mizrahi, 1967; Smith, 1991; Stafford, 1962).
https://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE02/Bordin02.html
[[ this is a different torpedo problem ?? ]]
THE GREAT TORPEDO SCANDAL 1941-43
https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1996/the-great-torpedo-scaodal-1941-43
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo
Torpedoes were so expensive that the Navy was unwilling to perform tests that would destroy a torpedo. [[??]]
A CRISIS OF TRUST AND
CULTURAL INCOMPATIBILITY:
A Red Team Study of Mutual Perceptions of Afghan
National Security Force Personnel and U.S. Soldiers in
Understanding and Mitigating the Phenomena of
ANSF-Committed Fratricide-Murders
May 12, 2011
A CRISIS OF TRUST AND
CULTURAL INCOMPATIBILITY:
A Red Team Study of Mutual Perceptions of Afghan
National Security Force Personnel and U.S. Soldiers in
Understanding and Mitigating the Phenomena of
ANSF-Committed Fratricide-Murders
May 12, 2011
Jeffrey Bordin, Ph.D.
N2KL Red Team Political and Military Behavioral Scientist
jeffrey. bordin@afghan.swaanny.mil
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB370/docs/Document%2011.pdf
book
Lethal Incompetence: Studies in Political and Military Decision-Making
by Jeffrey T. Bordin (Author)
The diplomatic failures leading up to the invasion of Iraq and its insurgency aftermath have a long history. An incredible number of wars attest to the remarkable stubbornness of leaders presented with intelligence warnings that they are headed for trouble. There is a strong regularity of senior officials being taken by surprise simply out of sheer obstinacy in sticking to a false, preconceived notion. It has been estimated that decisions of elite governmental decision-makers to involve themselves in a war have involved major errors of fact, perhaps in more than 50% of all cases. This study analyzes the causes of such incompetent political decision-making. Specifically, it analyses impediments to the effective interpretation of intelligence information and assesses the propensity of certain leaders to selectively process intelligence in order to initiate premature and unwarranted military intervention. Psychological, social and organizational factors that contribute to decision-makers' premature aggression, acquiescence to erroneous normative demands, and obstinacy in maintaining false, preconceived notions were empirically analyzed. Psycho-political profiles developed included "The Cheney Syndrome." The first section of this book consists of a review of examples of governmental decision-making failures. The second section consists of an experimental analysis of these factors. 313 U.S. military officers completed a gaming exercise involving a terrorist crisis that also included a battery of psychological, social and political ideology measures. Officers' propensities to institute premature punitive measures based on minimal, ambiguous information as well as to acquiesce to erroneous authoritative demands were assessed. While documenting a solid background of examples of pathologies in decision-making and intelligence analysis, this study moved beyond the anecdotal nature of the case study approach. The presentation of the given terrorist scenario to each study participant allowed the same crisis situation to be repeated hundreds of times while varying the political, social, and psychological factors affecting decision-making and intelligence analysis. This allowed for a high degree of explanation and prediction of decision-making behaviors. The results of this study offer strong evidence of the value of utilizing a contextual approach to political and military psychology research.
Michael J. Keeney
2.0 out of 5 stars Too political, detracts from objectivity
Reviewed in the United States on May 12, 2012
Verified Purchase
I have reached p. 32, and out of all the many examples of incompetence, Bordin did not seem able to find a single one describing behavior involving a democrat president. Conversely, gaffes occurring during Republican administrations are attributed directly to President Nixon or President Regan. When Bordin reluctantly admits the potential that something bad may have occurred in a democrat administration, he names underlings, such as being critical of decisions attributed to Secretary of Defense McNamara rather than attributing the incompetence directly to President Johnson as is does in the case of Republican presidents. I am finding that this is making me skeptical of the scientific objectivity of the literature review and empirical work that will follow. Further, although the copyright is fairly recent (2006), much of the literature cited (such as Janis' Groupthink construct) has not sttod the test of further empirical investigation. I do not recommend this book, or at least suggest readers maintain a healthy skepticism.
torpedo
p.590
Bordin
during the late 1930s, naval officers discovered serious quality problems in torpedo manufacturing,
His doctoral dissertation at Claremont graduate school ha explored “how elite governmental decision makers come to ignore or refute valid information during their deliberations.” The paper began by recounting how, during the late 1930s, naval officers discovered serious quality problems in torpedo manufacturing, yet the officers “acquiesced to both political and organizational pressures to ignore” the defects. THen, in 1942, at the Battle of midway, nearly a hundred American airmen flew torpedo-armed planes against a vastly superior Japanese force. “Despite the Holocaust they were flying into”, Bordin recounted, “every aircrew pressed their attack ── many while literally engulfed in flames.” Yet their bravery came to naught because “not a single torpedo detonated against a Japanese warship.” This failure “enabled the Japanese to launch a devastating counter strike that culminated in the loss of the USS Yorktown and 141 American lives.” The title of Bordin's work signaled his perspective on these and similar cases: “Lethal incompetence: studies in political and military decision-making.” Early in his career, Bordin worried that he had been too hard on commanders he chronicled. Later, he decided, “I wasn't hard enough.”
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oBkzu73s1esw9jMfj-lrVJAc-L_E11qO/view?usp=sharing
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oBkzu73s1esw9jMfj-lrVJAc-L_E11qO/view?usp=sharing
https://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE02/Bordin02.html
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL COGNITION AND RESISTANCE TO ERRONEOUS AUTHORITATIVE AND GROUPTHINK DEMANDS DURING A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS GAMING EXERCISE
by Jeffrey Bordin, Ph.D.
Captain, U.S. Army Reserve
Paper to be presented at the Joint Services Conference On Professional Ethics, January 24-25, 2002, Springfield, VA.
In the late 1930 s naval officers responsible for monitoring the construction of the U.S. Navy s torpedoes discovered serious and widespread manufacturing defects. However, they acquiesced to political and organizational pressures to ignore the discrepancies. Unwilling to jeopardize their military careers, they took no corrective action (cf. Morison, 1963, pp. 12-13).
On the morning of June 4th, 1942, 51 U.S. warplanes armed with torpedoes took off in a desperate attack on a vastly superior Japanese military force that was closing on Midway Island. The U.S. airmen were well aware of the stakes and the almost insurmountable odds against their own survival. Despite the holocaust they were flying into, every aircrew pressed their attack many while literally engulfed in flames. Virtually all the aircraft were destroyed, and 98 airmen were killed. It is likely that at least two, and possibly three or more U.S. pilots attempted to crash their fatally stricken aircraft into a Japanese warship during their final moments; another bomber pilot, Captain Richard Fleming, succeeded in doing so later in the battle. Despite the incredible courage, the resolute determination and the selfless sacrifice of these attacks, not a single torpedo detonated against a Japanese warship. The torpedoes were defective (cf. Fuchida & Okumiya, 1982; Levite, 1987; Lord, 1967; Mizrahi, 1967; Smith, 1991; Stafford, 1962).
https://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE02/Bordin02.html
[[ this is a different torpedo problem ?? ]]
THE GREAT TORPEDO SCANDAL 1941-43
https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1996/the-great-torpedo-scaodal-1941-43
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo
Torpedoes were so expensive that the Navy was unwilling to perform tests that would destroy a torpedo. [[??]]
A CRISIS OF TRUST AND
CULTURAL INCOMPATIBILITY:
A Red Team Study of Mutual Perceptions of Afghan
National Security Force Personnel and U.S. Soldiers in
Understanding and Mitigating the Phenomena of
ANSF-Committed Fratricide-Murders
May 12, 2011
A CRISIS OF TRUST AND
CULTURAL INCOMPATIBILITY:
A Red Team Study of Mutual Perceptions of Afghan
National Security Force Personnel and U.S. Soldiers in
Understanding and Mitigating the Phenomena of
ANSF-Committed Fratricide-Murders
May 12, 2011
Jeffrey Bordin, Ph.D.
N2KL Red Team Political and Military Behavioral Scientist
jeffrey. bordin@afghan.swaanny.mil
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB370/docs/Document%2011.pdf
book
Lethal Incompetence: Studies in Political and Military Decision-Making
by Jeffrey T. Bordin (Author)
The diplomatic failures leading up to the invasion of Iraq and its insurgency aftermath have a long history. An incredible number of wars attest to the remarkable stubbornness of leaders presented with intelligence warnings that they are headed for trouble. There is a strong regularity of senior officials being taken by surprise simply out of sheer obstinacy in sticking to a false, preconceived notion. It has been estimated that decisions of elite governmental decision-makers to involve themselves in a war have involved major errors of fact, perhaps in more than 50% of all cases. This study analyzes the causes of such incompetent political decision-making. Specifically, it analyses impediments to the effective interpretation of intelligence information and assesses the propensity of certain leaders to selectively process intelligence in order to initiate premature and unwarranted military intervention. Psychological, social and organizational factors that contribute to decision-makers' premature aggression, acquiescence to erroneous normative demands, and obstinacy in maintaining false, preconceived notions were empirically analyzed. Psycho-political profiles developed included "The Cheney Syndrome." The first section of this book consists of a review of examples of governmental decision-making failures. The second section consists of an experimental analysis of these factors. 313 U.S. military officers completed a gaming exercise involving a terrorist crisis that also included a battery of psychological, social and political ideology measures. Officers' propensities to institute premature punitive measures based on minimal, ambiguous information as well as to acquiesce to erroneous authoritative demands were assessed. While documenting a solid background of examples of pathologies in decision-making and intelligence analysis, this study moved beyond the anecdotal nature of the case study approach. The presentation of the given terrorist scenario to each study participant allowed the same crisis situation to be repeated hundreds of times while varying the political, social, and psychological factors affecting decision-making and intelligence analysis. This allowed for a high degree of explanation and prediction of decision-making behaviors. The results of this study offer strong evidence of the value of utilizing a contextual approach to political and military psychology research.
Michael J. Keeney
2.0 out of 5 stars Too political, detracts from objectivity
Reviewed in the United States on May 12, 2012
Verified Purchase
I have reached p. 32, and out of all the many examples of incompetence, Bordin did not seem able to find a single one describing behavior involving a democrat president. Conversely, gaffes occurring during Republican administrations are attributed directly to President Nixon or President Regan. When Bordin reluctantly admits the potential that something bad may have occurred in a democrat administration, he names underlings, such as being critical of decisions attributed to Secretary of Defense McNamara rather than attributing the incompetence directly to President Johnson as is does in the case of Republican presidents. I am finding that this is making me skeptical of the scientific objectivity of the literature review and empirical work that will follow. Further, although the copyright is fairly recent (2006), much of the literature cited (such as Janis' Groupthink construct) has not sttod the test of further empirical investigation. I do not recommend this book, or at least suggest readers maintain a healthy skepticism.
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